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s<1/4
Table 1. Optimal pricing behaviour
pi =
2
3 s
s ∈ [1/4, 9/16[ pi = pj + 2√s − pj −1 if pj < p j
pi =
2
3 s if pj ≥ p j
pi =
pj + 1
2
if pj < pj0
s ≥ 9/16 pi = p˜ i(pj) = pj + 2√s − pj −1
if pj ∈ [pj0, p j[
pi =
2
3 s if pj ≥ p j
7
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PROOF. In order to prove the above Proposition, it suffices to notice that if
and if Q.E.D.
A few remarks are now in order. For although demands overlap and thus in
principle competition is possible, firms find it optimal not to compete; they behave
monopolistically and the market is not fully covered. Furthermore, for a symmetric
Nash equilibrium emerges in an area where reaction functions are downward sloping and thus
strategic substitutability is observed. In such an equilibrium, the net surplus of the indifferent
consumer located at the middle of the segment is nil. Finally, it is most noteworthy that in this
case strategic interaction leads firms to adopt a pricing behaviour which mimics collusion.
3. Conclusions
The main finding of this paper is that firms’ propension to compete is inversely related to
the level of demand, here approximated by the individual gross surplus from purchase. There
are demand configurations which might support competition with positive profits, and yet firms
find it optimal to set prices in a monopolistic or at least quasi-cooperative way. This is in line
with that large body of the literature aimed at showing a procyclical pattern of competitiveness
and thus a countercyclical pattern of the real price, e.g. Rotemberg and Woodford (1991). Two
extensions, namely, the endogenisation of costs and the explicit modelling of individual demand
price responsiveness, as suggested by Stiglitz (1984), are topics left to future research.
p j ≤ 2s /3 s ≤ 3/4;
pj0 ≥ 1 s ≥ 5/4.
s ∈]1/4, 3/4],
s ∈ [3/4, 5/4[,
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Then, for all firm i’s reaction function is
For all we have to check whether (ii) or (iii) holds. Clearly, (ii) holds for all values of
satisfying
while for all other values of case (iii) holds. Solving (9), we get
notice that
For finite values of s, we may now sum up firms’ pricing behaviour in table 1.
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
Notice that the strategic complementarity in prices usually observed in product differentiation
models (see Beath and Katsoulacos, 1991, p.22), arises here only for s>9/16. However, strategic
interaction does not necessarily yields a Nash equilibrium in prices where the latter are strategic
complements. Indeed, the relation between equilibrium prices and gross surplus is described by
the following:
PROPOSITION 2: (i) for p*=2s/3; (ii) for p*=s-1/4; (iii) for
p*=1.
pj ≥ p j =
2
3 s − 1 + 2√ s3 . (7
pj ≥ p j,
pi
*(pj) =
2
3 s . (8
pj < p j,
pj < p j
pi
D(pj) < p˜ i(pj) ⇔
pj + 1
2
< pj + 2√s − pj −1, (9
pj < p j,
pj < pj
0
= −5 + 4√s + 1 ; (10
pj0 > 0 ∀ s > 9/16.
s ≤ 3/4, s ∈]3/4, 5/4[, s ≥ 5/4,
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if
If instead then there exists a price such that the net surplus of the consumer
who is indifferent between the two firms is nil:
If firm i sets a price firm i gains monopoly profits as defined by (2); otherwise, if
she obtains the following duopolistic profits:
with intersecting at from below.2 Therefore, we have established the following:
PROPOSITION 1: assume then, for any profits of firm i are defined as
(b) Derivation of the reaction functions. The reaction function of firm i is defined as the optimal
choice of pi given pj. Taking into account the profit function referred to in Proposition
1, three possibilities arise. Denoting with and the prices maximizing, respectively,
and which are concave and single-peaked, then the optimal price is: (i)
(ii) (iii)
Consider case (i). We have if
implying
pj ≥ pˆ j.
pj < pˆ j, p˜ i(pj)
p˜ i = pj + 2√s − pj −1. (4
pi ≥ p˜ i(pj),
pi < p˜ i(pj),
pii
D
=
pi
2
(pj − pi + 1), (5
pii
D pii
M p˜ i(pj)
s ≥ 1/4; pj < pˆ j,
pii(pi | pj) = min(piiM;piiD).
pii(pi | pj)
piM piD piiM
pii
D
, piM if p˜ i(pj) ≤ piM;
piD if p˜ i(pj) > piM & piD < p˜ i(pj); p˜ i(pj) if piD > p˜ i(pj) > piM.
p˜ i(pj) ≤ piM
pj + 2√s − pj −1 ≤ 23 s , (6
2. Notice that for which coincide with when s<1. If as for
then for all and for all firm i’s profits are given by
pj < 2√s −1,p˜ i > 0 pˆ j pˆ j = s ,
pj ∈ [2√s −1, s], piiM.s ≥ 1, p˜ i < 0, pi > 0
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s can be interpreted as the reciprocal of the marginal utility of income (or money), this amounts
to investigating, within the relevant range of parameters, the bearings of a shock affecting
nominal income on the results yielded by this class of models (at least in this simplified version).1
We shall proceed as follows. We shall study firms’ optimal behaviour for Two basic
settings emerge. For very low values of s, each firm’s demand is independent of the other’s, so
that the market does not allow for any strategic interaction, and monopolistic pricing is
necessarily observed. For higher values of s, demands overlap, so that some scope arises for
strategic interaction - although this is not necessarily exploited - and firms’ behaviour must be
studied by deriving their reaction functions in the price space.
2.1. Isolated markets
Since for the consumer located in 1/2 transportation costs amount to 1/4, it is clear that
for s<1/4 the profit accruing to each firm is independent of the rival’s behaviour. Thus, both
firms behave monopolistically, maximizing a profit function defined as follows:
where defines firm i’s demand. This yields:
2.2. Overlapping demands
If firms may potentially compete for the consumers located in an area at the
center of the linear city, which widens as s increases. To derive the firms’ reaction functions,
we have to proceed in two steps, defining (a) the profit function of firm i for any price charged
by firm j, ; (b) the optimal pricing rule for firm i given the price charged by firm j.
(a) Derivation of the profit function. First, notice that is actually independent of pj for
where for s<1, while for Thus, for any s,
s ∈]0, 5/4[.
pii
M
= pi√s − pi ; i = 1, 2, (2
√s − pi
pi
*
=
2
3 s ; pii
*
=
2
3 s√ s3 . (3
s ∈ [1/4, 5/4[,
pi(pi | pj)
pi(pi | pj)
pˆ j = 2√s −1 pii = piiM = pi√s − pi,pj > pˆ j, pˆ j = s s ≥ 1.
1. Provided that locations are either exogenous or fixed in the short run, the present analysis
could be easily extended to both the case of n firms and that of the circular city described by
Salop (1979).
2
1. Introduction
The horizontal differentiation model introduced by Hotelling (1929) has produced a wide
stream of literature focusing on how firms startegically exploit the possibility of choosing their
respective locations in the product space in order to soften price competition.
Two major points are worth stressing. First, the attention paid to product differentiation
and its bearings on equilibrium profits has left many questions on the nature of price competition
in such settings virtually unanswered. Second, horizontal differentiation has generally been dealt
with under the assumptions of inelastic demand and full market coverage.
This paper is devoted to the investigation of short-run price behaviour when an exogenous
shock affecting nominal magnitudes brings about a contraction in market demand, which in turn
may induce firms to noncooperatively adopt price rules of monopolistic or quasi-cooperative
flavour. Thus, the present analysis gives a temptative but suggestive answer in the positive to
the question whether the intensity of competition may be inversely related to the level of market
demand, as it has been informally raised by Stiglitz (1984).
2. The model
Consider a duopoly in which firms 1 and 2 sell a physically homogeneous good along a
segment of unit length. Unit production costs are assumed to be constant and can be normalised
to zero without any loss of generality. Consumers are uniformly distributed over the segment,
with total density 1. Each consumer buys at most one unit of the good, drawing from consumption
a gross surplus s - invariant across consumers - and paying a full price pi+d2, where pi is the mill
price charged by firm i and d is the distance between the consumer and the patronized firm.
Total demand is equal to 1, i.e., all consumers are served, if the indirect utility function
is non-negative for all consumers. In such a case, as shown by D’Aspremont et al. (1979), the
Nash symmetric equilibrium prices turn out to be while the equilibrium locations are the
endpoints of the segment, 0 and 1. However, this solution clearly requires Provided that
location can be regarded as a long run choice, one might argue how firms’ pricing behaviour
may be affected by an exogenous shock reducing s below the above threshold level. Given that
U = s − pi − d
2 (1
pi = 1,
s ≥ 5/4.
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Abstract
In a spatial competition model, changes in firms’ competitive behaviour may occur when
the hypothesis that individual gross surplus is positive in equilibrium is relaxed. We prove that
there exists a region of the relevant parameter where firms’ behaviour mimics collusion, while
in another range they find it optimal to isolate from each other and behave monopolistically.
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